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Foreword
SEEDS is pleased to publish our twentyfirst issue, Professor Bina Agarwal’s Are
We Not Peasants Too?, exploring the
critical elements in securing effective
and independent land rights for women.
Although the author’s primary focus is
South Asia, the analytical framework and
proposed action plan are of relevance to
Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean,
and eastern Europe—indeed wherever
women’s use and control of arable land
are crucial to their economic well-being
and livelihoods. SEEDS issues 10, 14, and
16 provide readers with additional background to several topics discussed here,
with particular reference to Nepal, Zambia,
and India.

Are We Not Peasants Too? documents
the substantial and enduring barriers and
biases obstructing efforts to strengthen
women’s relationship to the resourcegenerating asset of land. Despite the centrality of this issue to reducing rural
women’s poverty and improving their
economic status, the author shows why
women’s independent claims to land
have been difficult to achieve, even

where progressive social movements
and legal reforms have recognized them,
such as in India.
To tackle such obstacles, Professor
Agarwal presents a range of cooperative
strategies for enabling women to retain
and cultivate the land and shows how
micro-credit and other programs can be
redirected to increase the amount and
productivity of land women control.
Recognizing that new policies and political will are required to foster and sustain
such experiments, the author ends with
a summary of how women are organizing
to place women’s access to land at the
center of national and global agendas.
In this spirit, SEEDS hopes that Are
We Not Peasants Too? will inspire grassroots women’s groups, NGOs, innovative
donors, policymakers, and others from
around the world to share examples of
how they have established strategies that
increase women’s access to this crucial
asset. Let us hear from you!
— Sandy Schilen, SEEDS Editor
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Are We Not Peasants Too?
Land Rights and Women’s Claims
in India
by Bina Agarwal

Introduction
In 1979, over two decades ago, a group
of poor women from West Bengal made
the following demand of their elected village council: “Please go and ask the government why, when it distributes land, we
don’t get a title. Are we not peasants? If
my husband throws me out, what is my
security?” (personal communication, Vina
Mazumdar, 1992). This demand underlined these women’s clear recognition
that their families alone could not guarantee them economic security. What they
also needed were fields of their own.

A Neglected Issue
In largely agrarian economies, arable land
is the most valued form of property and
productive resource. It is a wealth-creating and livelihood-sustaining asset. For a
significant majority of rural households it
is the single most important source of
security against poverty. Traditionally, it
has been the basis of political power and
social status. For many, it provides a sense
of identity and rootedness. It is an asset
that has a permanence that few other
assets possess. In some communities,
ancestral land also symbolically stands
for continuity of kinship and citizenship.
While many of these links are well recognized at the household level, their importance specifically for women has received little attention. Indeed, the issue
of women’s rights in land (and more generally in property) has been, until recently, largely neglected in both research and
policy. In fact, in almost all developing

2 • SEEDS

countries, large-scale surveys and agricultural censuses collect property-related information only by households, without disaggregating by gender. Nepal is a
recent exception where such data will
now be collected in its census. In most of
South Asia, including India, therefore,
we still have to depend on small-scale
surveys and village studies to assess
women’s access to land. These sources
reveal that typically few women own
arable land and even fewer effectively
control some.
The social and economic implications
of this are wide-ranging. Millions of
women in Asia, Africa, and Latin America
depend critically on land for a livelihood.
The typical process of agrarian transformation under which labor shifts from
agriculture to nonagriculture has been
slow and gender-biased. In many countries, those who have moved to nonfarm
work are largely men, while women have
remained substantially in agriculture.
Hence a disproportionate number of
those still dependent on land are women. In India, for instance, 58 percent of
all male workers but 78 percent of all
female workers, and 86 percent of all
rural female workers, are in agriculture.
Indeed the gender gap has been growing. Women’s domestic work burden,
lower mobility, lesser education, and
fewer investable assets limit their entry
into nonagriculture, and also their range
of nonfarm options. Moreover, the nature of women’s agricultural work is, to a

greater extent than for men, casual in
nature. Relative to men, women also continue to have lower real wage rates and
lower average real wage earnings in both
agriculture and nonagriculture.
As more men shift to urban or rural
nonfarm livelihoods, a growing number
of households will become dependent on
women managing farms and bearing the
major burden of family subsistence. The
percentage of de facto female-headed
households is already large and growing.
Estimates for India range from 20 to 35
percent. These include not just widows
and deserted and separated women, but
also women in households where the
men have migrated out and women are
effectively farming the land. These women will shoulder (and many are already
shouldering) growing responsibilities in
agricultural production but will be constrained seriously by their lack of land
titles.
Moreover, the male biases in land
ownership and transfers that have been
noted in many developing countries are
in danger of being replicated in new land
reform initiatives and property rights
formulations. For instance, agrarian
reform is a major policy issue in postapartheid South Africa; and new private
property rights in land and other assets
are now being constituted in Eastern
Europe and the former USSR. Here new
gender inequalities are already being
created (Meer 1997; Verdery 1996).
It is therefore timely and essential to
examine in more detail why it is important for women to have effective and
independent land rights, what obstructs
their realizing their claims, and what
could be done to improve the situation.
While these issues are discussed here
largely in the Indian or the South Asian
context, many are also relevant to other
developing regions and to the transition
economies. And although the focus here
is on arable land, since that is such a crucial form of property and means of liveli-

hood in South Asia, many of the arguments and concerns could be extended
to cover women’s rights in a dwelling
house or in other forms of property.

Defining Land Rights
Rights (in any form of property) are defined here as claims that are legally and
socially recognized and enforceable by
an external legitimized authority, be it a
village-level institution or some higherlevel body of the State. Land rights can
stem from inheritance, transfers from the
State, tenancy arrangements, land purchase, and so on. They can be in the form
of ownership or usufruct (rights of use),
and can encompass differing degrees of
freedom to lease out, mortgage, bequeath,
or sell.
Three additional distinctions are relevant here. First, there is a difference
between the legal recognition of a claim
and its social recognition, and between
recognition and enforcement. A woman
may have a legal right to inherit property, but this may remain merely on paper
if the claim is not recognized as socially
legitimate or if the law is not enforced.
Second, there is a distinction between
ownership and effective control. It is
sometimes assumed incorrectly that
legal ownership carries with it the right
of control in all its senses. In fact, legal
ownership may be accompanied by
restrictions on disposal, as among the
Jaffna Tamils of Sri Lanka and several
communities in Latin America, where a
married woman needs her husband’s
consent to alienate the land she legally
owns. Third, we need to distinguish
between rights vested in individuals and
those vested in groups.
Our concern here is with women having effective and independent rights in
land, effective rights being rights not
just in law but also in practice; and independent rights being rights that women
enjoy in their own capacity and independent of those enjoyed by men.
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Why Land Is Important
for Women
My bangles are broken,
my days of shame are gone.
I have one small son, one calf, one field.
A calf to feed, a son to nurture
but the field, baiji [sister] this half
acre of earth
to feed me, to rest my head.
—Malli, a Rajasthani widow
(author’s interviews, 1987)

Effective and independent land rights
for women are important on at least four
counts: welfare, efficiency, equality, and
empowerment.

Welfare

Andrea Booher, UNDP

It is well accepted that land access can
notably reduce a household’s risk of poverty, but for several reasons land solely
in men’s hands need not guarantee female welfare.
First, there are persistent gender inequalities and a bias favoring males in
the distribution of resources within households, including allocations for basic necessities such as health care, education,
and, in some regions, even food. Biases
in food and health care are revealed especially in anthropometric measures (e.g.,

weight and height for age, weight for
height, etc.), morbidity rates, and most
starkly in female-adverse sex ratios.
In contrast, direct land transfers to
women are likely to benefit not just women but also children. Evidence both from
India and from many other parts of the
world shows that women, especially in
poor households, spend most of the
earnings they control on basic household
needs, while men spend a significant
part of theirs on personal goods, such as
alcohol, tobacco, etc. (Dwyer and Bruce
1988). This, in turn, affects child welfare. Children in rural India are found
more likely to attend school and receive
medical attention if the mother has more
assets (Duraisamy 1992). Among marginal farmer households in Kerala (south
India), the mother’s cultivation of a home
garden (the output of which she controlled) was found to have a consistently high positive effect on child nutrition
(Kumar 1978). In urban Brazil, the effect
on child survival probabilities was found
to be several times greater when asset
income accrued to the mother, compared
with when it accrued to the father, and
the positive effect on the health of daughters was especially high (Thomas 1990).
Apart from differences in spending pat-
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en finding supplementary wage employment, and serves as an important asset
base for rural nonfarm enterprises. For
instance, those with land are found to

Food and Agriculture Organization

terns, women with assets such as land
have greater bargaining power, which can
lead to more gender-equal allocations of
benefits even from male incomes. In
short, women’s and children’s risk of
poverty would be reduced and their welfare enhanced if women had direct access to land, and not just access mediated through male family members.
Second, women without independent
resources are highly vulnerable to poverty and destitution in case of desertion,
divorce, or widowhood. In parts of western and northwestern India, not uncommonly, rural women even from rich parental and marital families, deprived of
their property shares when widowed,
can be found working as agricultural
laborers on the farms of their well-off
brothers or brothers-in-law. The fate of
deserted and divorced women is worse.
Relatives, including sons and brothers, often do not provide the expected
economic security to women who are
widowed or whose marriages break down.
Many of them end up living on their own.
In fact, mortality risks among widows
tend to be higher among those living as
dependents of male relatives compared
with those who are heads of households,
and who presumably have some independent means of subsistence (Rahman
and Menken 1990). Indeed, for widows
and the elderly entitlement to family
care can depend critically on whether
they have property to bequeath. As the
elderly often say: “Without property
children don’t look after their parents
well” (Caldwell et al. 1988: 191).
Land can provide women both direct
and indirect benefits. Direct advantages
can stem from growing not just crops,
but trees, a vegetable garden, or grass
for cattle. Indirect advantages arise in
various ways: owned land can serve as
collateral for credit or as a mortgageable
or saleable asset during a crisis. Land
(whether owned or controlled by women) also increases the probability of wom-

generate much higher rural nonfarm
earnings from self-employment than the
totally landless (Chadha 1992). In short,
women’s access to even a small plot
can be a critical element in a diversified livelihood system, and can significantly improve women’s and the family’s welfare, even if the plot is not large
enough to provide full family subsistence. And independent access to land
will become increasingly important for
women as marital and kin support erodes,
and female-headed households multiply.

Efficiency
In addition to welfare gains, more gender-equal land rights could also enhance
productive efficiency. First there is an
incentive effect. Although it is widely
recognized that security of tenure can be
critical for motivating farmers to make
productivity-enhancing investments in
their fields, the need for similar incentives within the family has been largely ignored. Some recent studies suggest
that incentives could be as important
within families. In Kenya, for example,

Number 21 , 2002 • 5

6 • SEEDS

Fourth, women in many parts of
South Asia are often better informed
than men about traditional seed varieties and the attributes of trees and
grasses. If they had greater control over
land and farming, this knowledge could
be put to better use.
Fifth, tenure security, and especially
titles can empower women to assert
themselves better with agencies that
provide inputs and extension services.
While welfare arguments for women’s
land rights have received some policy
attention, there is yet little recognition
Food and Agriculture Organization

where men and women often cultivate
separate plots, the introduction of weeding technology in maize production raised
yields on women’s plots by 56 percent
where women controlled the output, and
only by 15 percent on their husbands’
plots, where women also weeded but men
got the proceeds (Elson 1995). Whether
similar results will obtain in India and
other countries will require field testing
and analysis. But the Kenya results provide an important pointer to the outputenhancing potential of secure land rights
for women and of their control over produce.
Second, where land access is in the
form of titles (which serve as collateral in
many regions), secure rights for women
would help increase output by improving women’s access to credit. This can
prove especially crucial in situations
where women are the principal farmers,
as where male out-migration is high, or
where widows (or wives) are cultivating
separate plots still formally owned by kin.
Third, research from some other parts
of the world suggests that women might
use land more efficiently than men in
certain contexts. In Burkina Faso, for
instance, due to their choice of cropping
patterns women achieved much higher
values of output per hectare on their own
plots than their husbands did on theirs
(Udry et al. 1995). Although women’s
yields for given crops were lower than
men’s, this was due to their lesser access
to inputs such as fertilizers which were
concentrated on the men’s plots. The
study estimated that output could be
increased by as much as 10–20 percent if such inputs were reallocated
from plots controlled by men to those
controlled by women in the same
household. A literature review of the
effect of gender on agricultural productivity in several countries of Africa and
Asia also concludes that output could be
increased notably if women farmers had
the same access to inputs and education
as male farmers (Quisumbing 1996).

of the potential positive effects on efficiency. In fact, some argue that land
transfers to women will have a negative
efficiency effect, in that such transfers
will reduce output by reducing farm size
and increasing fragmentation. However,
there is no noteworthy evidence of an
adverse size effect on output. In fact, in
India and other parts of South Asia,
small farms are found to have a higher
value of output per cultivated unit than
large farms (Banerjee 2000); and frag-

mentation can arise equally with male
inheritance. Also, where necessary,
farmers have dealt with fragmentation in
various ways: consolidation through purchase and sale; land leasing arrangements to bring together cultivation units
even where ownership units are scattered; and joint investment and cultivation by small groups. In India, as a result
of these measures, the number of fragments per farm has declined from 5.7 in
1961 to 2.7 in 1991.
It is thus important to contest a priori
negative efficiency arguments, such as
the fragmentation argument, which are
typically put forward only in relation to
women’s claims to inheritance, but not in
relation to men’s claims. Equally, the positive productivity effects of more genderequal land access, and of greater tenure
security and access to inputs for women
farmers, found in some existing studies,
need emphasis, even while expanding the
base of empirical analysis. As noted, these
positive effects could be especially important in regions of high female headedness, or where the feminization of agriculture is moving apace as more men
than women enter nonfarm occupations.

Equality and Empowerment
The equality argument is an important
one in and of itself, since gender equality is a measure of a just and progressive
society. But, in addition, equality in land
rights is a critical element in women’s
economic empowerment. The word
“empowerment” is now widely used in
the literature, usually without being
defined. Here empowerment is defined
“as a process that enhances the ability of
disadvantaged (‘powerless’) individuals
or groups to challenge and change (in
their favor) existing power relationships
that place them in subordinate economic, social and political positions”
(Agarwal 1994: 39).
Endowing women with land would
empower them economically as well as

strengthen their ability to challenge
social and political gender inequities.
An illustrative example is women’s experience in the Bodhgaya struggle in Bihar
(eastern India). Here, in the late-1970s,
women and men of landless households
jointly agitated for ownership rights in
the land they cultivated, which was
under the illegal possession of a Math (a
temple–monastery complex). During the
movement, women demanded independent land rights, and received them in
two villages, with marked implications.
In the villages where men alone received
titles, women’s insecurity grew, with an
increase in men’s tendency to threaten
wives with eviction in situations of domestic conflict: “Get out of the house, the
land is mine now” (Manimala 1983: 15).
But where women got titles they graphically described their feeling of being empowered: “We had tongues but could not
speak, we had feet but could not walk.
Now that we have the land, we have the
strength to speak and walk” (Alaka and
Chetna 1987: 26). (Also see Box 1.)
This sense of empowerment accompanying improved land rights also
enhances women’s ability to assert
themselves within the home, in the community, and with the State.
From the preceding discussion it is
clear that land rights can serve multiple
functions in rural women’s lives which
are not easy to replicate through other
means. This is important to keep in mind
since the present thrust of most national and international agencies is not on
land rights but on micro-credit programs
which are being promoted as a panacea,
especially (but not only) for poor rural
women. Although credit is clearly an important need for poor women, many individual women not only face problems in
retaining control over such loans, but the
privileging of this one form of support
over all other livelihood sources can
prove problematic and diversionary. A
number of evaluations show that such
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Box 1

The Bodhgaya Movement
The Bodhgaya movement, initiated in 1978 in
the Gaya district of Bihar, was a struggle by
landless laborers and sharecroppers to gain
rights in land which they had cultivated for
decades. The land, some 9,575 acres spread
over 138 villages, was held by a Math (a
monastery-cum-temple complex), much of it
in violation of land ceiling laws. Math officials
exploited the peasants and also sexually
abused the women. The struggle emerged
under the leadership of the Chatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini, a Gandhian-socialist youth organization founded in 1975 by Jayaprakash
Narayan (a contemporary of Mahatma Gandhi) and committed to improving the lot of
the disadvantaged. Vahini membership was
restricted to those under thirty, and included women in every tier of the organization.
The movement lasted several years. Its
primary slogan was Jo zameen ko boye jote,
voh zameen ka malik hai (those who sow and
plough the land are the owners of the land).
Women played a crucial role in the movement. In 1980, for instance, the activists
decided to seize the land and cultivate it
independently of the Math. About 3,000
acres were captured and ploughed. Despite
police attacks, sowing was completed. At harvest time, the attacks were renewed. Since
women usually harvested the crops, it was
they who faced the brunt. As the repression
intensified, women’s involvement increased.
Women also participated in the movement’s
nonviolent protests, despite threats of beatings and rape by the Math’s hired ruffians.
Over time, women began participating in
equal numbers with the men and also courting arrest with accompanying children.
In addition, women organized shivirs
(camps) to discuss their concerns within the
struggle. They focused on women’s exploitation, their exclusive responsibility for housework, discrimination against girl children,
men’s verbal and physical violence against
them, and (most importantly) women’s need
for independent land rights. Resolutions
were passed, including one against wifebeating and another demanding land in
women’s own names.
Finally in 1981, the government identified
1,000 acres of the Math’s land for redistribu-
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tion to the agitating farmers. The Vahini
drew up a list, giving priority to landless
laborers, the disabled, widows, and small
peasants. Women other than widows did not
figure in the list, and they protested their
exclusion: “We were in the forefront of the
fight, carrying our children in our wombs
and in our arms. We went to jail and
faced the lathis [sticks]; we also did all the
housework. But when the land was distributed, we were pushed back, we didn’t even
come to know by what rules the land was distributed” (Manimala 1983: 15).
After a prolonged debate on why women
should have independent land rights, in 1982
it was decided that women too would receive
land in their own names in future distribution. In two villages the villagers unanimously approved lists for giving land only to
women and widowers. But the District Officer in charge of registering the titles strongly opposed this, arguing that there was no
precedent for giving land to persons other
than heads of households, who were typically men. The villagers, however, refused to
take any land unless it was given to women.
Almost three years passed before women
were finally allocated land. In time, all the
Math’s illegal holdings were distributed and
women received land in various ways: individual titles, joint titles with husbands, as
widows, destitute and disabled persons, and
(without precedent) in some cases as
unmarried adult daughters. Although such
women were few since most girls there were
married before they were eighteen, the idea
that unmarried daughters were eligible was
an important step forward. Each person
received about one acre.
How did all this come about? Initially,
women encountered opposition at three levels: from husbands, from the Vahini activists,
and from government officials. Women’s ability to overcome these layers of opposition
depended on several factors: men’s recognition over time that women’s contributions
were crucial to the movement’s success; the
growing solidarity among women and their
articulation of their gender-specific interests
as distinct from those of the men of their
class and community; the support of some

middle-class female Vahini activists with a
feminist perspective; and the process of
debate in which women persuasively countered opposition.
For instance, when the women protested
against their exclusion from the Vahini’s initial list of land recipients, the men argued:
“What difference does it make in whose name
the land is registered?” The women responded: “If it doesn’t make a difference, then put
it down in the woman’s name. Why argue
about it?” To the suggestion that women’s
demand would weaken class unity, the women replied: “Equality can only strengthen,
not weaken an organization, but if it does
weaken our unity, that will mean that our real
commitment is not to equality or justice but
to the transfer of power, both economic and
social, from the hands of one set of men to
the hands of another set of men.” When the
men asked: “How can you cultivate the land
on your own? Who will plough it for you?”
they replied: “Well, who will harvest your
crop in that case? We are ready to cultivate
the land with hoes instead of ploughs, but we
want it in our names” (Manimala 1983).
Indeed the significance of the Bodhgaya
struggle from women’s perspective lies not
just in its being South Asia’s first land struggle where women’s land interests received
explicit attention. It also lies in the process
by which this was achieved. It is noteworthy
that a largely illiterate peasant community

credit programs do not reach the poorest
households, let alone change the gender
balance in property ownership and control. In fact a recent study for Bangladesh (cited in IFAD 2001) identified a
lack of access to land and homesteads as
major factors in the exclusion of the
poorest from credit NGOs.
An alternative to the existing approach
of promoting micro-credit for non-landrelated micro-enterprises is to link land
and micro-credit by providing rural women who depend on land-based livelihoods
with credit for leasing in or purchasing
land in groups (as discussed later). Here
micro-credit would complement rather
than substitute for efforts to enhance

discussed at length issues such as women’s
independent rights in economic resources,
domestic violence, female education, and
postmarital residence, and on several counts
resolved them in women’s favor. The debate,
although arduous, brought significant rewards. The question of gender equality began
to be seen by many not as divisive but as
integral to the movement’s success. As a
result, women’s participation in decisionmaking also increased, wife-beating and verbal abuse against women was deemed shameful, and male villagers began to take care of
cooking and childcare in the women’s shivirs,
while the women participated in discussions.
The Bodhgaya women were also indirectly helped by a growing women’s movement
and a spreading feminist consciousness in
the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
when issues concerning women’s rights were
being raised in various forums. In contrast,
women in the Tebhaga movement of the 1940s
(see Box 2) had not demanded independent
land rights. At that time, there was an absence of cohesiveness among women on gender questions; a lack of spokespersons among
them who could articulate a feminist perspective; and the absence of a widespread women’s movement in the country. For the Bodhgaya women, the situation was favorable on
all these counts. They were thus able to articulate their interests overtly. However, the
Bodhgaya experience still awaits replication.

women’s land rights. But this would
require a significant shift from the existing focus of most micro-credit programs.

Women’s Land Access
in Practice
To what extent do women have effective
land rights in practice? Consider the
three major ways by which women can
gain land: inheritance, State transfers,
and the market. Of these, inheritance is
the most important, since in most countries arable land is largely privatized. In
India, 86 percent of arable land is privately held. Moreover, efforts to pro-
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Association for Land Reform and Development, Bangladesh

mote gender equality in inheritance are
important for ensuring that the land
obtained through the government or the
market does not pass solely to male
heirs in the next generation.

Inheritance
It is not easy to determine how many
women inherit land in practice, given
the noted absence of gender-disaggregated land ownership data at the all-India
level. To assess ownership patterns, we
therefore have to depend on small-scale
studies. These can nevertheless be revealing, such as a 1991 sample survey of rural
widows by Martha Chen covering seven
states (Table 1; see also Chen 2000).
Chen found that of the 470 women with
landowning fathers, only 13 percent inherited any land as daughters. (Regionally, the figure ranged from 18 percent in
south India to 8 percent in north India.)
For all-India this means that 87 percent
of the surveyed women did not receive
their legal due as daughters.
Women as widows fared somewhat
better. Of the 280 widows whose deceased husbands owned land, 51 percent inherited some. But this still means
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that half the widows with legal claims did
not inherit anything. And of those that
did, typically their shares were not
recorded formally in the village land
records. Other studies have shown that
where the land is so recorded, invariably
the widow’s name is entered jointly with
adult sons, who effectively control the
land. The popular perception is that the
widow’s share is for her maintenance and
not for her direct control or use. Widows
without sons rarely inherit. Moreover,
widows in India constitute only about 11
percent of rural women, 76 percent of
whom are over 50 years old, many of
them too old to effectively work the land.
Hence inheritance as widows does not
compensate women for their being disinherited as daughters.

Government Transfers
A second potential source of land for women is State transfers. These transfers can
be part of land reform programs, resettlement schemes for those displaced by large
dams and other projects, or antipoverty
programs. Irrespective of the program under which the transfers occur, typically

Table 1 Rural Widows Who Inherited Land as Daughters and as Widows
Total
samplea
No.
262

Father
owned land
No.
229

71
49
50
92

70
42
50
67

2
2
1
13

3
5
2
19

57
39
45
52

16
27
23
32

28
69
51
62

Southern India

283

241

43

18

87

45

52

Andhra Pradesh
Kerala
Tamil Nadu

79
104
100

77
65
99

12
28
3

16
43
3

37
15
35

18
10
17

49
67
49

545b

470

61

13

280

143

51

Region/State
Northern India

Bijar
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh (hills)
West Bengal

All regions

Women who inherited as daughters
No.
%
18
8

Husband
owned land
No.
193

Women who inherited as widows
No.
%
98
51

Source: Martha Chen (personal communication of results from her 1991 survey).
a

For all states, other than Kerala, the sample consists only of Hindu widows. In Kerala, it also includes some Muslim matrilineal households.
This is a subsample consisting of currently widowed women. The original sample had 562 ever-widowed women spread over 14 villages, two
each in the seven states listed.

b

the land is allotted almost exclusively to
males, even in communities which traditionally practiced matrilineal inheritance,
such as the Garos of northeast India.
Also this bias is found no matter which
political party is in power. In West Bengal, for instance, in the late 1970s and
early 1980s the Communist Party of India
(Marxist), which was then in power, carried out “Operation Barga”—a major land
reform initiative which sought to secure
the rights of tenants by systematically
registering them. However, it primarily
registered men. Land distributed to the
landless also went almost entirely to men.
Although an exception was supposed to
be made for single-women households—
those divorced, deserted, and without
adults sons—few qualifying single women received land in practice. A village in
Midnapur district studied by Gupta
(1993) is indicative. She found that 98
percent of the 107 holdings distributed
went to men. In nine out of ten femaleheaded households the land went to the
women’s sons; and only eight of the eighteen single women received land. Married women did not receive even joint
titles.
This male bias has a long history. Historically, even in peasant movements in
which women were significant participants, they were not recognized as inde-

pendent claimants to land. The Tebhaga
and Telangana movements of the 1940s
are cases in point (see Box 2 on the former). Exceptions to this pattern are few
and far between, one being the earliermentioned 1970s Bodhgaya struggle, in
which women demanded and received
independent land shares in two villages.
In the more recent period, a few of
India’s Five Year Plans have given some
recognition to women’s land claims. For
instance, the Eighth Five Year Plan
(1992–97) directed state governments to
allot 40 percent of ceiling surplus land to
women alone and the rest jointly to both
spouses. (This was land acquired by the
government from those owning more
than a permissible ceiling.) The Ninth
Five Year Plan (1997–2000) went further in terms of policy formulation. In its
chapter on poverty alleviation it incorporated many of the author’s recommendations on promoting group rights and collective farm management for women,
along with providing infrastructural support. It also recognized the need for collecting gender-disaggregated information on land ownership and use.
The crunch, however, lies in whether
state governments are willing to implement these recommendations. Also the
ceiling surplus land available for distribution is extremely limited: it came to only

Number 21 , 2002 • 11

Box 2

The Tebhaga Story
The Tebhaga movement emerged in 1946–47
in undivided Bengal, in the footsteps of the
great Bengal famine of 1943. Sharecroppers
in the region had no occupancy rights and
faced a constant threat of eviction. The landlords took half the produce while bearing no
part of the production costs, levied illegal
taxes, and sexually abused the women. The
movement, spearheaded by the Bengal
Provincial Kisan Sabha (BPKS), under the
leadership of the Communist Party of India,
demanded a reduction of land rents and an
end to other forms of exploitation. The
women’s self-defense league played a critical
mobilizing role among women.
Prior to the movement, sexual exploitation was closely linked to caste and economic oppression:
Like the mangoes of the [sharecropper’s] trees, like the bananas of his
garden, like the gourds of his thatched
roof, like the eggplant from his garden, his daughters and daughtersin-law were the [landlord’s] property…. If the [landlord] expresses his
wish, the daughter or the wife of the
[sharecropper] will be sent to the
[landlord’s] house. (a woman activist,
quoted in Cooper 1988: 102)
Both Hindu and Muslim women participated in the movement in large numbers:
Women who remained in the villages
during the day…[warned] people of
police arrivals by sounding alarms,
blowing conch shells, for example.
They provided shelter and food for
activists. Women who frequently went
to market became responsible in
some areas for communication and
carrying messages between organizers. In some villages there were special [women’s corps] which guarded
villages. Poor peasant women participated in meetings and demonstrations, joined delegations to landlords, and occasionally members of
Tebhaga committees, although not
holding particular positions.
However, women’s militancy was remembered mostly because of their
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actions to resist arrests, when they
displayed incredible courage, initiative and heroism in rescuing people.
(Cooper 1988: 270–271)
Women’s weapons of resistance were
household implements, the commonplace objects of their daily existence, with which they
(often successfully) confronted the police:
As the police entered the villages, bells
and conch shells used to be blown
and the echo could be heard from one
end to the other.... It was the peasant
womenfolk who organized this novel
form of warning. Almost immediately on hearing this, all the womenfolk would take hold of broomsticks,
lathis and their husking pestles...
and form a barricade on the village
road, so that the police could not
enter. (Chakravartty 1980: 90)
In disarming police parties, in resisting
arrests, and in rescuing people, women’s initiatives assumed heroic proportions. On several occasions, attempts by landlords to
appropriate the harvested paddy from the
peasants’ fields with police help were also
thwarted by the women. For instance, in
Kendemari village:
... they least expected that a militant
group of [peasant] women... would
advance with daos, choppers and
broomsticks. Tied to their sareeends they carried a handful of dust,
mixed with chilli powder. As they
approached the police, they threw
this powder in their eyes and the
police ran for their lives. (Chakravartty 1980: 94).
Often, however, the confrontations were
violent, and many courageous women were
injured or killed in police firings.
During the campaign, several gender concerns were voiced, such as wife-beating. As
one woman graphically put it: “[When] the
husband and wife together are dying in the
field, in the battle for Tebhaga; when the two
together are fighting against the enemy, how
then was it possible for one soldier to beat
the other after returning home?” (cited in
Custers 1987: 177). In some areas the cam-

paign against domestic violence made a
strong impact, but in others the culprits got
off lightly. Especially in Muslim areas when
male peasants objected to women attending
the peasant committee meetings, some of
the women retorted: “It does not hurt your
sense of propriety when we sow or harvest in
the fields along with you. How does it become
objectionable when we want to attend kisan
samiti meetings?” (cited in Custers 1987:
172). Objections nevertheless continued,
and the issue was never resolved.
Despite women’s participation, unequal
gender relations persisted both within and
outside the movement. Whatever gains
women made were ad hoc. Their objections
to domestic violence led to the boycott of

0.56 percent of India’s arable land at the
time of the Eighth Plan and today it comes
to less than 0.2 percent of the country’s
arable land. Even in West Bengal, a state
with the largest amount of area declared
surplus to date, the total ceiling surplus
land came to only 8.7 percent of the
state’s arable land, and today virtually
none is left for distribution.
Hence while it is important to reduce
biases in government land transfers, and
thereby also to send the message that
women’s claims deserve attention, in
terms of actual land area such transfers
can go but a small way in improving
Indian women’s land status.

Through the Market
The third source of land for women is
through lease or purchase. The weight of
this option will depend on financial, institutional, and infrastructural support to
women. In itself, this is a limited option
since individual rural women seldom
have access to adequate financial resources for this purpose. Also, in terms
of purchase, rural land markets are often
constrained and land is not always available for sale. For instance, an all-India
study of land sales among a sample of

some of the male activists responsible, but
the issue was not seen as integral to the larger political struggle to change economic and
social relations that the movement was
addressing. In particular, women’s rights in
land were not discussed. Women also played
little role in decisionmaking. And while during the most intense periods of the agitation
women emerged from their domestic roles,
they were forced to return to housework and
largely unchanged gender relations within
the family when the struggle ended. It was
not until several decades later, during the
Bodhgaya movement, that oppression within
the family and women’s rights in land
emerged as significant concerns within a
peasant movement in South Asia.

landowning households in the early
1970s found that only 1.75 percent had
sold any land during the survey year
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985). Another
study, for Uttar Pradesh (northwest India) that examined land sales over a
thirty-year period from the 1950s to the
1980s, found that only 4.1 percent of
owned agricultural land had been sold
(Shankar 1990). Hence for both sexes,
the possibilities of purchasing land are
limited, with women being especially
constrained. Land purchase through the
market thus cannot compensate for gender inequalities in inheritance or government transfers. There is somewhat greater potential for obtaining land on lease,
since this is more readily available.
For both lease and purchase, however, external support to women would improve access. For instance, in parts of
South Asia, groups of landless women
have been using subsidized credit provided by the State, for leasing in or purchasing land in groups, and cultivating it
jointly (as elaborated further below).
Through such collective endeavor, land
through the market could well prove an
important supplementary means for
women to acquire land, even if not the
primary means.
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Obstacles to Women’s
Land Access
What obstructs women from gaining
greater land access? While the difficulties that individual women face in getting land through the market were indicated above, those relating to private
and government land are more complex.

Privatized Land: Legal, Social,
and Administrative Biases
To my brother belong your green fields
O father, while I am banished afar…
—(Hindi folksong)
Always you said
Your brother and you are the same
O Father. But today you betray me…
My doli leaves your house.
—(folksong, personal communication
Veena Das)

Inheritance laws
In most of India, inheritance was traditionally patrilineal (that is ancestral property passed through the male line), with
some limited matrilineal pockets (where
ancestral property passed through the
female line), as in northern and central
Kerala in the south and Meghalaya in the
northeast (Agarwal 1994, 1995). Among
the majority Hindu community, for instance, the common pattern was for
women to inherit only in the absence of
male heirs, typically in the absence of
four generations of men in the male line
of descent. Widows had the first claim
and daughters followed. What women
received, however, was only a limited interest, that is, they enjoyed the property
during their lifetime after which it reverted to the original source. Also women’s
rights of disposal were restricted: they
could not mortgage, give, or sell the land,
except in exceptional circumstances. In
most cases, the rights of Muslim women
in customary practice were very similar
to those of Hindu women in their regions
of location.
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During the twentieth century, however, through the concerted efforts of women’s organizations, liberal lawyers, and
social reformers, inheritance laws shifted significantly toward gender equality.
Although these efforts met with stiff resistance from many opinionmakers and
politicians (including India’s first President), the changes were facilitated by
the historic moment. It was a time when
the idea of building a modern forwardlooking nation was becoming part of the
popular imagination. Also the first elected government of Independent India had
a notable body of progressive professionals in Parliament, who supported the
idea of gender-equal laws. As a result,
most Indian women were able to negotiate much greater rights in postindependence law than they had had a century
ago. For instance, the Hindu Succession
Act (HSA) of 1956 made sons, daughters,
and widows equal claimants in a man’s
separate property and in his share in the
joint family property. It also gave women
full control over what they inherited, to
use and dispose of as they wished. Similarly, the Muslim Personal Law Shariat
(Application) Act of 1937 substantially
enhanced Muslim women’s property
rights compared with those prevailing
under custom.
Yet, in both communities some notable
inequalities remain. Both Hindu and Muslim inheritance laws, for instance, treat
agricultural land differently from other
property. The HSA exempted tenancy
rights in agricultural land from its purview. Hindu women’s inheritance in tenancy land thus depends on state-level
tenurial laws, which in most northwestern states specify an order of devolution
that strongly favors male agnatic heirs.
Women come very low in the order of
heirs, as was the case under age-old customs. Furthermore, these inequalities
cannot be challenged on constitutional
grounds because land reform laws come
under the Ninth Schedule of the Consti-

between northwest India and the rest of
the country.
The enormity of women’s disinheritance (such as that noted in Chen’s survey, with only 13 percent of daughters
inheriting), however, cannot be explained
by unequal laws alone. Rather, among
the critical factors underlying both the
law and the gap between law and practice are social and administrative biases.
Social bias
Consider first the gap between legal
rights and actual ownership. In most communities that were traditionally patrilineal there is strong male resistance to
endowing daughters with land. Apart
from a reluctance to admit more claimants to the most valuable form of rural
Ashok Dilwali

tution. This constitutional provision was
meant to protect land reform laws from
being challenged by entrenched class interests, but in the process (albeit unwittingly) it also entrenched gender inequality.
Likewise, the Shariat Act of 1937,
applicable to Muslims in India, excluded
all agricultural land (both tenanted and
owned) from its purview. Subsequently,
some of the southern states extended
the provisions of this Act to also cover
agricultural land. In all other regions,
however, agricultural land, unlike other
property, continues to devolve according
to customs, tenurial laws, or other preexisting laws. In most of northwest India,
such laws and customs give women’s
property rights very low priority.
A second source of inequality lies in
the differential inheritance shares for men
and women. In the HSA, for instance, although sons and daughters have equal
shares in a man’s separate property,
there is also the continued recognition of
joint family property in which sons but
not daughters have rights by birth. Again
while three of the southern states (Andhra
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka) and
Maharashtra have amended this by including daughters as coparceners, and
Kerala has abolished joint family property altogether, all the other states remain
highly unequal. In the case of Muslim
law, differential shares arise because
daughters are allowed only half the share
of sons in any property.
In both Hindu and Muslim legal systems the regional contrast is also striking. Gender inequality increases as we
move from south India northward. Among
Hindus, for instance, northwest India is
the most gender unequal in relation to
women’s claims in both agricultural land
and joint family property, while the
southern states provide relative legal
equality on both counts. Central India
falls in-between. The map of women’s
legal rights under Muslim law looks
rather similar, with a distinct contrast

property, resistance also stems from social practices which determine marriage
choices and postmarital residence. Traditionally among matrilineal communities where daughters had strong claims
in land (as in Kerala and Meghalaya),
postmarital residence was in or near the
natal home. This kept the land under the
overall purview of the natal family, as did
close-kin marriage. In contrast, in traditionally patrilineal communities, post-

Number 21 , 2002 • 15

marital residence was patrilocal (the
woman joined her husband in his natal
home) and often in another village. In
addition, in northern India close-kin marriage was forbidden among most communities, and there were social taboos
against parents asking married daughters for help during economic crises.
Many of these customs continue today, and obstruct women’s claims especially among upper-caste Hindus of the
northwest who are the strictest in forbidding in-village and close-kin marriages, and in socially restricting parents
from seeking help from married daughters. Here endowing a daughter with
land is seen as bringing virtually no reciprocal benefit, and any land inherited
by her is seen as lost to the family.
Daughters face the greatest opposition
to their inheritance claims among such
communities. Opposition is less in south
and northeast India where in-village and
close-kin marriages are allowed, and
parents can, if they need to, seek support from married daughters.
Many women also forgo their shares
in parental land in favor of brothers. In
the absence of an effective state social
security system, women see brothers as
an important source of security, especially in case of marital breakup, even if
in practice brothers are seldom willing
to support sisters for extended periods.
Cultural constructions of gender, such
as how a “good sister” would behave,
and practices such as female seclusion in
some areas also discourage women from
asserting their rights. Where women do
not “voluntarily” forgo their inheritance
claims, male relatives have been known
to file court cases, forge wills, or resort
to threats and even physical violence.
The gender gap between the ownership and effective control of land is as
striking as that between law and practice. Here too social practices and
notions of male entitlements play an
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important role. For instance, marriages
in distant villages make direct cultivation by women difficult. In many areas
this is compounded by illiteracy, high
fertility, and social restrictions on
women’s mobility and public interaction.
While the practice of veiling is geographically restricted, the ideology of female
seclusion is more widespread and operates in complex ways. Effectively, it
restricts women’s contact with men by
gendering forms of behavior, and gendering public and private space. Indeed
in many north Indian villages, there are
identifiable spaces where men congregate which women are expected to
avoid, such as the market place.
This territorial gendering of space
reduces a woman’s mobility and participation in activities outside the home,
especially market interaction; limits her
knowledge of the physical environment;
and disadvantages her in seeking information on new agricultural technologies
and practices, in purchasing inputs, and
in selling the product. These restrictions
are strongest in northwest India (and
especially in the plains) and virtually
absent in the south and northeast. Of
course, the cultural construction of gender, which defines appropriate female
behavior, is not confined to northwest
India; it also restricts women in southern
India. But the strong ideology of purdah
in the northwest circumscribes women
in particular ways.
This regional difference in the social
restrictions women face is also reflected
in women’s labor force participation rates,
which are among the lowest in the northwest. Although this does not imply lesser
workloads for women in aggregate terms,
it does indicate lesser work mobility,
lower economic visibility, and sometimes
lesser exposure to the range of agricultural tasks.
Other difficulties facing women farmers include their limited control over

cash and credit for purchasing inputs,
gender biases in extension services, ritual taboos against women ploughing, and
demands of advance cash payments by
tractor or bullock owners for ploughing
women’s fields. (No such demand is usually made of male farmers, who, even if
they are small owners, are assumed to be
creditworthy.) Taboos against ploughing
increase women’s dependence on male
help and reduce yields if ploughing is not
done in time.

to claim their shares, they discouraged
daughters from doing so. Village councils also tend to favor men on this count.
*
At one level, all these constraints—
legal, social, and administrative—appear
formidable. Yet, as noted throughout,
there is a striking regional variability in
the strength of the constraints (Agarwal
1994). This provides potential entry
points for change. South India has the
fewest obstacles. Here legal rights are
relatively more equal, in-village and
close-kin marriage is allowed, there is
virtually no purdah, and female labor
force participation is medium to high.
Northwest India is the area of most difficulty on all these fronts. Northeast and
central India come in-between. South India could thus provide an important starting point for furthering the goal of gender equality in effective property rights.
Demonstrated achievements in one region could help subsequent attempts in
other regions.
Photo Division, United Nations, New York

Administrative bias
Community- and family-related social
constraints are compounded by the unhelpful approach of many government
functionaries who typically share the prevailing social biases and often obstruct the
implementation of laws favoring women.
The bias is especially prevalent in the recording of daughters’ inheritance shares
by village officials. In the northwestern
state of Rajasthan, for instance, a number of village officials told the author
that although they encouraged widows

Government Transfers
While male bias within families can to
some extent be explained in terms of
conflicting interests and social attitudes
in relation to private land, why do governments also transfer public land mostly to men? There appear to be several
reasons for this bias.
To begin with, there is the common
assumption that men are the primary
cultivators and breadwinners and women
are the helpers and dependents. There
is also a widespread social perception
regarding women’s appropriate roles and
capabilities. Here patrilineal biases have
influenced even matrilineal communities.
In Meghalaya, for instance, when government officials were asked by the author
in 1989 why, even in a traditionally matrilineal society, they did not allot land to
women, they responded: “Women can-
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not come to our office to fill out papers.”
Yet in nearby streets there were numerous women traders selling their wares.
More generally, land-related policy
continues to be formulated largely on the
assumption of a unitary household within which resources transferred to men
are seen as benefiting the whole family.
However, the substantial evidence of
unequal intrafamily resource allocations,
noted earlier, indicates otherwise. Interestingly those who most vociferously oppose such resource transfers to women
often implicitly recognize that families
are far from harmonious or altruistic
institutions. Rather they fear that women will leave the family if they have the
fallback option that property ownership
would provide. For example, during the
Constituent Assembly debate on the reform of inheritance and marriage laws
suggested in the Hindu Code Bill in 1949,
one Congress legislator from West Bengal
argued: “[If the daughter inherits,] ultimately the family will break up” and
queried: “Are you going to enact a code
which will facilitate the breaking up of
our households?” (GOI 1949: 1011). Forty years later, in 1989, following my presentation on gender and land rights at a
land reform seminar at the Indian
Planning Commission, the then Minister
of Agriculture from northwest India exclaimed: “Are you suggesting that women
should be given rights in land? What do
women want? To break up the family?”
Ironically, neither legislator need have
feared this if indeed households were
models of harmony and altruism, or if its
members had the same interests and
preferences.
A concern with family unity also limits
the nature of transfers to women in the
rare cases when such transfers do take
place. For instance, there is a longstanding assumption in public policy that
farms will be cultivated on a family basis.
As a result, the emphasis has been mostly on giving women joint titles with hus-
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bands, and allotting titles to widows only
in the absence of adult men in the family.
In fact, it is fallacious to assume that
improving women’s economic situation will
lead to family break-up. The likelihood is
that greater economic equality between
men and women within the Indian family will help improve intrahousehold
resource allocation and gender relations
and strengthen family relationships. For
instance, husbands will be less likely to
desert or divorce wives who own property or have other means of access to
assets such as land or homesteads.

What Should Be Done?
Given their entrenched nature, how can
the noted obstacles to women’s land
rights be overcome? To enhance gender
equality in land and livelihoods, changes
appear necessary on at least five counts:
conceptual, legal, social, institutional,
and infrastructural (see Box 3).

Conceptual and Empirical
For a start, it appears necessary to challenge the conventional model of a harmonious male-headed family in analysis
as well as policy, and to recognize the
family for what it is: a unit of both cooperation and conflict, of both sharing and
selfishness, where women and men can
have different interests, preferences, and
motivations, where self-interest also
enters, and where allocations are often
unequal and affected by differential bargaining power. Indeed, there is an
emerging consensus among genderaware economists about the validity of
the bargaining approach to understanding intrahousehold dynamics. But ideologically the unitary household model
holds strong. If we are to think of radical
and effective interventions, it appears
critical to shift to more realistic assumptions about intrafamily behavior when
formulating policy.

Box 3

What Needs to Be Done?
For Improving Women’s Claims
in Private Land
1. Gender equality in inheritance laws
2. Legal literacy and legal support services
3. Village-level recording of women’s
shares
4. Social and economic support for women from outside the family, including
through an effective social security
system
5. Changing social attitudes
For Improving Women’s Access
to Public Land
Gender equality in public land distribution in:
1. Land reform schemes
2. Resettlement schemes
3 Other schemes, such as those initiated
under poverty-alleviation programs
For Improving Women’s Access
to Land Via the Market
1. Subsidized credit for land purchase or
lease
2. Land purchase or lease via group formation, and group cultivation of such land
For Improving the Viability of
Women’s Farming Efforts
1. Agricultural extension services and
other infrastructural support for
women farmers
2. Resource pooling and group investment in capital equipment; cooperative marketing
3. Women’s effective presence in village
decisionmaking bodies
4. Gender sensitizing through the media,
educational institutions, etc., for changing social norms and social perceptions.

It is also important to gather systematic gender-disaggregated information
on land ownership and use, both for bet-

ter understanding the existing situation
and for effective monitoring. The Agricultural Census of India and the National
Sample Surveys (NSS), which both carry
out periodic data collection on land ownership and use, collect only householdlevel information. There is a case here
for incorporating, in the next NSS round,
a special module of questions for obtaining gender-disaggregated intrahousehold information. If necessary, this could
initially be tried on a pilot basis, and subsequently extended to the full survey.
Nepal, as noted, has already redesigned
its census to gather such information.
Researchers collecting land-related data
in other projects could also be encouraged to collect gender-disaggregated information on land ownership and use.

Legal
The legal aspects should include at least
three elements.
Amending the inheritance laws: These
would include a number of changes, such
as bringing agricultural land on par with
other forms of property in the laws applicable to Hindus as well as those applicable to Muslims; abolishing the joint
family property provision in the HSA, as
done in Kerala; and so on. Even though
legal changes are not a sufficient condition for ensuring women’s ownership and
control over property, legal equality provides an essential tool in the hands of
gender-progressive groups, who could then
work for de facto equality. Progressive legislation also underlines the State’s commitment to the idea of gender equality.
Legal literacy: This is essential to
make laws effective and needs to reach
both adults and near-adults. For the latter, legal literacy could be made part of
the curriculum in the senior years of
school.
Recording women’s shares: Village
women need support to ensure that their
land shares are correctly recorded by the
relevant village official, and need legal
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advice and help if they wish to contest
their claims with either the family or the
administration.
In all these efforts, gender-progressive groups could play a significant role.

Social
Unless and until women’s claims begin to
be seen as socially legitimate, parents
who have a male bias are likely to use
the right of making wills to disinherit
daughters, even if the laws are made
fully gender-equal. Similarly, efforts are
needed to change conservative or negative perceptions about women’s appropriate roles and abilities, and to challenge social norms that restrict women’s
public mobility and interaction.
For instance, the problem posed by
women’s marriage outside the natal village arises only partly from the distances
involved and mostly from social strictures
on women’s mobility, and social perceptions about women’s lesser abilities and
deservedness. Men are seldom denied
their property rights even if they migrate
to distant parts (as many men, especially
younger ones, do to seek jobs in cities).
Although social attitudes, norms, and
perceptions are not easy to alter, certain
types of interventions could further the
process. For instance, government initiatives to transfer land titles and infrastructural support to women farmers would
have a notable demonstration effect. Interventions to strengthen extrafamily
economic support for women, including
through a government social security
scheme, would help reduce women’s dependence on relatives and especially on
brothers in whose favor women often
forgo their claims. Overall, economic support would also enhance women’s ability
to challenge inequalities in the family
and community. In so far as the popular
media is one of the arenas where gender
roles and relations are both projected
and constructed, media interventions in
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a gender-progressive direction would
also help transform social attitudes.

Institutional
Reforms in this area need to be holistic
and innovative. For instance, policymakers generally assume that farms will be
cultivated on a family basis. Hence to the
extent that the government is beginning
to recognize that women farmers too
have legitimate claims in land, joint titles
(titles held jointly by husbands and
wives) are mostly favored. Such titles
have both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, clearly getting some land is better for women than
having none. But on the negative side,
joint titles also present women with several potential problems. Women often
find it difficult to gain control over the
produce, or to bequeath the land as they
want, or to claim their shares in case of
marital conflict. As some rural women
explained: “By being tied to the land we
would be tied to the man, even if he beat
us” (author’s interviews, 1989). Also
with joint titles wives cannot easily exercise their priorities in land use if these
priorities happen to differ from those of
their husbands. Most importantly, joint
titles constrain women from exploring
alternative institutional arrangements
for cultivation and management.
Individual titles, by contrast, give
women greater flexibility and control
over the land. At the same time, individual women often lack funds for equipment or inputs, and where holdings are
very small individual investment in
equipment can prove uneconomical.
Individual women also face considerable
pressure from male relatives who want
to acquire or control the land.
However, institutional solutions to
these problems can be found, provided
women’s land claims are not tied to their
spouses, and if the unit of investment
and cultivation is not limited to the

Table 2 Women Managing Land Under Various Institutional Arrangements
Source of land

Investment

Cultivation

Use

Examples of actual
practice

Inherited or purchased

Individual

Individual

Crops

Typical

Inherited, purchased,
or government transfer

Joint (with
other women)

Individual

Crops

Bodhgaya (Bihar)
(government promoted)

2. Individual ownership, Group purchase of
group management
private land by women,
by women
divided into individually
owned plots

Joint (with
other women)

Joint

Crops

Deccan Development
Society (DDS) in
Andhra Pradesh

3. Group of
women

Group lease of private
land

Joint

Joint

Crops
DDS, BRAC
Vegetables Kerala

4. Group of
women

Male owners; cultivation
overseen by women’s
groups

Individual

Individual

Crops

DDS’s Community
Grain Fund Scheme

5. Group of
women

Government transfer
to women’s groups

Joint

Joint

Crops

Untried so far

Form of control
Conventional approach

Individual women
Alternatives

1. Individual
women

household, indeed is not defined by the
household at all. Table 2 summarizes
these alternatives.
One alternative would be to help
women who own individual holdings
(whether obtained through inheritance,
purchase, or from the government) to
invest in capital inputs jointly with other
women, while managing production individually. Male farmers have done this in
several regions, by jointly investing, say,
in a tubewell where they have contiguous
plots. This reduces the individual cost of
major investments. Women owners of
plots could be encouraged to do the
same. In fact, in Bodhgaya, a government
scheme provided funds to groups of five
farmers each to invest in pumpsets. Two
such groups were constituted of women
farmers alone. Although there are no follow-up reports on how well this worked,
it was a step in the right direction.
A second type of arrangement could
be for women to purchase land jointly
while owning it individually and farming
it collectively. One of the most interesting examples of this is the Deccan
Development Society (DDS), an NGO
working with poor women’s collectives
in some 75 villages in Medak district—a

drought-prone tract of Andhra Pradesh
(AP) in southern India. DDS has helped
women from landless families establish
claims on land, through purchase and
lease, using various government schemes
(for a detailed discussion, see Menon
1996; Satheesh 1997; and Agarwal 2001).
One such scheme of the Scheduled
Caste Development Corporation in AP
provides subsidized loans to landless
scheduled caste women for buying agricultural land. Catalyzed by DDS, women
form a group, apply for the loan after
identifying the land they want to buy,
and divide the purchased land among
themselves, each woman being registered
as the owner of about an acre. Cultivation, however, is done jointly by each
group. Today 24 women’s groups in 14
villages are jointly cultivating 474 acres
of purchased land. In the process of
working together, they have learned to
survey and measure land, hire tractors,
travel to distant towns to meet government officials, obtain inputs, and market
the produce. Moreover, DDS has systematically promoted organic farming in all
its crop cultivation schemes. Women also
grow a combination of crops (rather than
a single crop), which reduces the risk of

Number 21 , 2002 • 21

total crop failure and provides a more
balanced diet.
Joint purchase and cultivation of land
by women’s groups could now be encouraged in other states as well, on the basis
of other government schemes. For instance, a 1995–96 central government
scheme in India provides loans to the
poor for land purchase as part of the Integrated Rural Development Programme.
A third possibility lies in women leasing land as a group and cultivating it
jointly. Under one of DDS’s programs,
women in AP lease in land from private
owners. Initiated in 1989, the program is
now said to cover 623 acres across 52
villages. Under another of DDS’s efforts,
women’s groups have used loan money
available via the government’s poverty
alleviation scheme, DWACRA (Development of Women and Children in Rural
Areas), for leasing in land. Committees
of women examine the lease proposals,
assess land quality, keep records of each
woman’s work input, and ensure equitable distribution of wages and produce.
Women who fail to turn up for collective
labor are subject to fines (such as two
days’ wage equivalent) decided by the
women in their weekly group meeting.
Persistent default can lead to exclusion
from the group (author’s interviews,
September 1998). Several women’s groups
have used the revolving fund provided
under this scheme to collectively lease
in and cultivate land. An assessment in
1995 showed that each woman participant received enough cereal and pulses
to feed the whole family for a month, in
addition to receiving harvest wages.
DWACRA loans have seldom been used
in such innovative ways.
DDS is not the only NGO encouraging
land leasing by women’s groups. In Kerala, some women’s groups are leasing
land during the off-season for vegetable
cultivation. In Bangladesh, women’s
groups belonging to the Bangladesh Ru-
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ral Advancement Committee (BRAC)
grow crops on leased-in land.
A fourth type of institutional arrangement is of women’s groups managing and
overseeing cultivation on land owned by
men. Again DDS provides an illustrative
example. Here women are jointly overseeing the cultivation of privately owned
land that had been lying mostly fallow.
Most of this was ceiling surplus land of
poor quality distributed by the government to landless men. The land remained
largely uncultivated, while the families
depended heavily on the public distribution system (PDS), which was woefully inadequate for providing food security. Supported by the Ministry of Rural Development, DDS initiated this program to bring
fallow land under the plough, by extending subsidized loans to the owners. Under the scheme, each participating farmer can enter two acres, and get loans in
installments over three years. In return,
over five years, the farmer gives a specified percentage of the grain he harvests
to a Community Grain Fund (CGF). Committees of women make sure that the
farmers use the loans for cultivation and
collect the harvest share for the CGF.
This grain is sold at a low price to the
poorest households in each village. The
CGF thus serves as a form of alternative
PDS. This project is now working in 43
villages, covering 3,263 acres and 2,247
marginal and small farmers, and is estimated to have produced enough extra
grain to provide 3 million total extra
meals or 1,000 extra meals per family.
A fifth type of arrangement, untried
to date, is one where poor rural women
could hold group rights over land distributed by the government, or otherwise
acquired by women (Agarwal 1994). Effectively, the women would be stakeholders in a kind of land trust. Each woman
in the group would have use rights but
not the right to alienate the land. The
daughters-in-law and daughters of such

Viksat, Gujarat

households who are resident in the village would share these use rights. Daughters leaving the village on marriage would
lose such rights but could re-establish
them by rejoining the production efforts,
should they return, say on divorce or
widowhood. In other words, land access
would be linked formally with residence
and working on the land, as was the case
under some traditional systems when
land was held collectively by a clan.
In these various institutional alternatives, women are not just adjunct workers on family farms; they have direct
control over production and distribution. Cooperation is between women
with common interests, and not between households. The arrangements enable women to gain access to land
through the market or through the community—access that women rarely have
as individuals. Where linked with land
pooling, joint investment, and collective
management, these arrangements can
also help overcome any problems of
small size and fragmentation.
Moreover, a collective approach to
land management helps women mobilize
funds for capital investment on the farm,

take advantage of economies of scale,
and cooperate in labor sharing and product marketing. In addition, if the land is
held under a system of group rights (as
in the fifth alternative) it would strengthen women’s ability to withstand pressure
from relatives and retain control over the
land; and it would circumvent the problem of inheritance, since the women would
not have rights of alienation (see Box 4).
It would also circumvent the issue of
outside-village marriages, since women’s
rights would be based on residence. In
1995, when the author asked a number
of women elected to village panchayats
in Madhya Pradesh which arrangement
they felt might be of most advantage to
women—individual titles, joint titles
with husbands, or group rights with
other women—most strongly supported
the idea of group rights (Madhya
Pradesh Chief Minister’s consultation
meeting in 1995 on the state’s proposed
Policy for Women).
Some policymakers and scholars argue against cooperative farming by pointing to India’s failed efforts of the 1950s
and early 1960s. However, the focus then
was on households, and on male heads as

Number 21 , 2002 • 23

Box 4

The Deccan Development Society: Impact of
Women Acquiring Land and Farming Collectively
The following quotes capture the changes
women have experienced:
Our husbands used to drink and beat
us. Now the buffaloes are ours, the
land is ours and they are working
too. Nobody is taking advantage of us
women. (Ratnamma, Algole village, cited
in Hall 1999)

Now [with land] we have the courage
and confidence to come out and deal
with people and property by ourselves. (Chilkamma, Krishnapur village,
cited in Hall 1999)

Now we are self-sufficient. [We are]
able to get food and clothing…. Previously we had nothing and had to
say yes to everything; now we have status because we have the land. (Pastapur women’s group, cited in Hall 1999)

Initially the men said: If women go to
meetings, what should we men do—
wash the dishes? We said, men and
women should work equally… Are
we the only persons born to work?
Earlier we ate half a roti, now we eat
one. (Sharifabi to author 1998)
[With group cultivation] women can
share the profit and the responsibility. In individual cultivation, different women have different levels of
agricultural knowledge and resources for inputs. In collective cultivation they can make unequal contributions. Those with less can compensate the others by taking a reduced share of the harvest, or by
repaying them in installments. Differ-

representatives of households. Not only
did gender receive no mention, but inadequate attention was paid also to socioeconomic inequalities between households, with the result that cooperatives
were often large-farmer dominated. A
crucial difference in the approaches outlined here is that the institutional forms
discussed shift the focus of cooperative
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ent levels of contribution are fine, because the women all know what each
other’s resources are. (Chinanarsamma,
Pastapur village, cited in Hall 1999)

They [the high-caste people] used to
call us with the caste name which
was very derogatory. They would
also call us in the singular form.
Now they put the motherly [respectful] suffix and give us equal seats….
It is only because we have an organization that they [the landlords]
won’t touch us—that they are scared
to cross us. (Ratnamma, Algole village,
cited in Hall 1999)

[We] found that during the course of
meeting, we became a kind of mutual support group. If any woman fell
ill or had a problem, the others would
try and help. So it became a habit to
meet, and we were not afraid of family disapproval. Gradually the family realized the importance of our
meetings to us and fell silent. (Single
women’s group to author, 1998)

The first sense of empowerment came
to women and men in the community when the women started leasing in
land. Men, and especially powerful
men in the villages, had the perception that women were useless, that as
agricultural labourers they could only
work under supervision. This perception was slightly internalized by
the women. The land leases completely debunked this view. (P.V. Satheesh,
Director of DDS, cited in Hall 1999)

efforts from disparate village households
to disadvantaged individuals with common interests. Focusing on the effects on
poor women could open an important window of opportunity to revive land reform,
community cooperation, and joint farming in a radically new form.
For trying out some of these institutional arrangements the southern states

could be starting points, since here both
laws and the social context (as noted)
are relatively less gender-biased than in
the northern states.

Infrastructural
The success of women’s farming efforts,
whether as individuals or groups, can
depend crucially on their access to infrastructure. As noted earlier, there are significant gender (in addition to class) inequalities in access to credit, labor, other
production inputs (including hired equipment), and information on new agricultural technologies. Poor women cultivating very small plots have the most difficult time in this regard.
Prevailing gender biases in the delivery
of government infrastructure thus need
to be removed. To some degree, this could
be done by employing more women in
agricultural input and information delivery systems (women extension agents
are often recommended for this purpose),
but such systems also need a reorientation of male functionaries so that they
too contact and assist women farmers.
Also, dependence on the State alone
may not be enough, or have the same
potential for success in reaching women
as nongovernmental initiatives. For instance, in credit delivery to poor women,
NGOs such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the Self Employed Women’s
Association (SEWA) in India have been
more successful than government agencies. The role of NGOs could similarly be
important in providing technical information, production inputs, and marketing facilities to groups of women farmers.
BRAC in Bangladesh is a case in point:
although it does not focus only on women, it provides a range of relevant informational, technical, and market support
services to its members. A systematic
promotion of women’s cooperatives for
production inputs and marketing could
also be considered.

Collective Action
If today… [they] who fought for the Independence of India are to be denied
their just rights, then our hard-earned
freedom is no more than a handful of
dust.
—Padmaja Naidu, Congress Legislator
(Parliamentary debates over the Hindu
Code Bill, 1951)

For initiating and sustaining the
complexity of changes required to
strengthen women’s land claims in
India, the committed involvement of a
range of actors, and especially of a wide
spectrum of women, will be necessary.
It will require various forms of collective
action by women, both in relation to
State policy and its implementation, and
in relation to land access via the market,
the community, and the family. Such collective action should also seek to bring
into its fold gender-progressive elements
(men and women) within the State,
political parties, and civil society groups.
After over two decades of the women’s movement in India, many now recognize the importance of collective action.
But much of the effort to enhance women’s economic empowerment has been
concentrated on issues other than land
(or property), such as better wages,
group credit schemes, micro-enterprise
development, and so on. Group action is
now needed for women to gain access to
land, in recognition of its central importance in most rural women’s livelihoods,
whether as the primary or a supplementary income source.
The local bureaucracy would be more
likely to register individual women’s
claims in family land if there were collective pressure from gender-progressive
groups. Such organizations could also
provide women with vital information
about the laws and legal support, if necessary. In fact, a woman’s group in the
Santal Parganas is providing both legal
support and financial help to women who
wish to contest their claims (personal
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communication from social activist Nitya
Rao, Bombay, 1997). Similarly, SEWA in
Gujarat gives women loans to help them
register their names as joint owners in
their husbands’ land (personal communication, Renana Jhabvala, 1997).
Gender-progressive organizations could
also strengthen women’s bargaining
position through economic and social
support structures that reduce women’s
dependence on male relatives, especially their brothers in whose favor women
often forfeit their claims As a woman
member of BRAC tellingly asserted:
“Well the organization is [now] my ‘brother’ ” (Hunt 1983: 38). Such organizations
could also help women demand that the
government put in place a well-structured social security system.
Equally, a collective challenge by women can facilitate some change in restrictive social norms. Even female seclusion
practices can be subject to change
through group challenge. In fact women’s
attempts to collectively challenge purdah
go back a long way. In India in the 1920s
and 1930s, for instance, many individuals
and organizations, both Hindu and Muslim, highlighted the burden and constraints imposed on women by purdah;
and resolutions against the practice were
also passed by a number of groups. In the
city of Calcutta, an anti-purdah day became an annual event in the 1930s, organized by the Hindu Marwari business
community (which prescribed strict
purdah). In 1940, some 5,000 women
attended an anti-purdah conference.
The woman president of the conference
arrived in a car driven through the city
by a Marwari woman, followed by a procession of Marwari women on foot led by
girls riding on horseback (Forbes 1981)!
Today the challenge to purdah continues both in India and in other parts of
South Asia. In Bangladesh, for instance,
while economic exigency has created the
need to challenge purdah, group solidarity has strengthened women’s ability to
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sustain the challenge. As a women’s group
organized by BRAC noted in the 1980s:
They said... [we] are ruining the
prestige of the village and breaking
purdah.... Now nobody talks ill of us.
They say: “They have formed a group
and now they earn money, it is
good.” (cited in Chen 1983: 177, 165)

In fact, the experiences of the
Grameen Bank, BRAC, SEWA, and many
other NGOs working with poor women,
using a group approach, suggest that
some restrictive social norms could be
challenged successfully as a by-product
of forming groups for the more effective
delivery of economic programs.
Group support for village women can
be provided both by separately constituted groups which give women specialized
help, and by organizations comprised of
village women themselves. The presence
of more women in the village panchayats, as a result of the one-third reservation for women provided by the 73rd
Constitutional Amendment in India in
1992, can also strengthen rural women’s
hands. Although simply having more
women in such bodies cannot guarantee
gender-progressive programs, the record
of elected all-women village panchayats
preceding the Amendment, as in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, leaves
room for optimism: women in these bodies were found to be more sensitive to
women’s concerns and to give priority to
their needs in ways that male panchayat
members typically did not (Gandhi and
Shah 1991). Women’s presence in positions of authority also has a favorable
demonstration effect and can change
social attitudes and perceptions about
women’s roles. Moreover, village women
are more likely to take their grievances
to women representatives than to allmale bodies.
However, support for women’s land
claims on a large scale, and beyond
localized experiments, will need much
more broad-based collective action by

women. For building such cooperation,
economic and social differences between
women might prove to be obstacles on
certain counts. But there are still significant areas of mutual benefit that cut
across class/caste lines, around which
successful cooperation would be possible, and which could serve as starting
points. One is legal reform. Women of
both rich and poor peasant households
with a stake in family land stand to gain
from gender-equal inheritance laws.
Many people mistakenly assume that the
percentage of such women is small. In
fact it is substantial: despite the highly
skewed distribution of land, some 89
percent of rural Indian households own
some land, even if most own only small
plots. Equally, challenging restrictive social norms will bring benefits for women
of both well-off and poor households.
The experience of the women’s movement in India also indicates that women
of different socioeconomic backgrounds
can cooperate strategically for legal reform, as they did in campaigns to amend
dowry and rape laws, despite differences
in ideologies, agendas, and social composition. Moreover, many urban middleclass women activists have played and
continue to play important roles in promoting poor rural women’s economic and
social concerns, such as supporting their
campaigns for higher wages, and their
programs for wasteland management,
credit, and small-enterprise development.
In more recent years, there have been
also some significant cases of middleclass activists promoting poor women’s
land claims, as in the Bodhgaya movement in Bihar, the Shetkari Sanghatana
in Maharashtra, and the DDS in Andhra
Pradesh. These experiences again indicate that cooperation between women,
which cuts across economic and social
heterogeneity, is possible on a number of
issues and in varied contexts.
All said, there now appears to be a
favorable climate for raising the question

of women’s independent claims to land
and livelihood, and it is imperative to do
so, given the noted importance of land in
women’s lives. Some NGOs which earlier
concentrated on other issues are now
beginning to focus on women’s property
issues, including agricultural land and
homestead plots in rural areas, and
dwelling houses in urban areas. Cases in
point are SEWA in Gujarat, Action India
in Delhi, and the Association for Land
Reform and Development in Bangladesh.
Several grassroots groups and development organizations in South Asia have
held workshops on the question of women and land in recent years. In Nepal a
movement has been ongoing for several
years spearheaded by feminist lawyers
for reforming gender-unequal inheritance laws. A number of South Asian
women’s groups also have been arguing
for gender equality in inheritance laws
by emphasizing that their constitutions
promise equal treatment of women and
men. Moreover, women’s groups that
have not raised the issue of women’s
land and property claims directly have
still, over the years, spread an awareness of gender concerns. This has created an environment within which women’s claims to land can be placed more
centrally in the arena of public concerns—something that was not easy to
do twenty years ago.
A window of opportunity is also provided by the growing attention being
given to watershed development and
localized irrigation schemes by a number
of NGOs and some government agencies, in several parts of South Asia. But
once land becomes more valuable with
the availability of irrigation, women’s
land claims are unlikely to be recognized. The opportune time to establish
women’s claims is during the process of
developing the watershed or irrigation
facility, not afterward.
Moreover, as noted, there needs to be
a shift away from the overwhelming pre-
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be facilitated by emerging international
support for women’s claims in property.
The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) has focused on equality in
property as one of its important directives. The United Nations Conference on
Human Settlements at its Istanbul meeting in 1996 also focused centrally on
women and land. Since then the Huairou
Commission in conjunction with the
UNDP, Habitat, WEDO, and the Women’s
Caucus of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development has held several
discussions with women’s groups worldwide, to examine regional progress in enhancing women’s access to land and property. The Huairou Commission is also requesting support for a global campaign to
promote women’s claims in land and property, and in housing rights for the urban
poor under the auspices of the United
Nations Center for Human Settlements.
All these national, regional, and international efforts that are beginning to
emerge suggest that today the climate is
certainly more favorable than it was two
decades ago, for responding positively to
the concerns raised by poor women in
West Bengal: “Why don’t we get a title?
Are we not peasants?”
Indian Agricultural Research Institute, Delhi

occupation of most rural NGOs, donor
agencies, and governments with microcredit delivery toward the creation of
productive assets, especially landed assets, in women’s own hands, and toward
enhancing women’s capacities as farmers. In this context, women’s rights in
arable land and homesteads need to
become a central part of the development
discourse. Here development agencies
that fund research or grassroots action
could also play a significant positive role.
In seeking change, the aforementioned
regional variations in women’s social position and hence in the extent of opposition to women’s land claims could be put
to useful effect, for instance by initially
building a momentum for change in regions of less opposition (such as in the
southern states of India), and then working for change in the more resistant
regions.
Finally, given that this issue is significant and relevant for women in many
countries, there is scope here for sharing
experiences and strategies for change;
for building horizontal linkages between
groups with similar goals; and for international coalitions both between South
Asian countries and between South Asia
and other parts of the globe. This would
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